Marquette Law Review
Volume 30
Issue 4 February 1947

Article 5

Quasi-Contracts - Wage Rights of Employees
During Period of Contract Negotiation
Frances M. Ryan

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Frances M. Ryan, Quasi-Contracts - Wage Rights of Employees During Period of Contract Negotiation, 30 Marq. L. Rev. 287 (1947).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol30/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

COMMENTS

QUASI-CONTRACIS--WAGE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES DURING
PERIOD OF CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
The recently decided case of Martin v. Campanaro, determined
by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, is of interest in that
it touches on an interesting aspect of the present-day labor problem
and also because it again reviews the classification of contracts, a
controversy almost as old as the law itself.
The case arose when thirty-six employes of the Suburban Bus
Company, Inc., among whom was Campanaro, filed their claims for
additional wages with the referee in bankruptcy, which claims were
opposed by Martin, the trustee in bankruptcy of the Suburban Company. These claims were based on services rendered from May 24,
1944, to May 3, 1945. The employes had been represented by a
labor union, known as Local Division 1134 of the Amalgamated Association of Street Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America,
A. F. of L., which organization acted at all times as their sole bargaining representative. From 1937 until May 24, 1944, at which time
the last one expired, yearly contracts fixing wages and working conditions had been made. Prior to the expiration date of the last of
these contracts, the union notified the company that it desired to
confer with it in regard to the conditions of a new contract. Negotiations were held until December of that year, when, no agreement
having been reached, the matter was referred to the National War
Labor Board. There followed hearings and recommendations by the
board, culminating finally in the issuance of a "directive order," in
which it recommended a pay increase of ten cents an hour to all workers to be retroactive to the date of the expiration of the last contract
between the union and the company. Before its issuance, however,
the bus company had become bankrupt. Between May 24, 1944, the
expiration date of the last union contract, and May 3, 1945, at which
time all the employes were discharged, the workers had received the
same weekly salaries which had been paid them under the old contract.
These wages had been paid in cash, the money being delivered in a
pay envelope on which was a statement of the amount received and
withheld. This was signed by each employe. On the basis of the
National War Labor Board's ruling the employes put in a claim against
the bankrupt for additional compensation, which was disallowed both
by the referee, and on appeal, by the District Court. The District
Court held that the order of the board was not legally enforceable
against the bus company, but that a contract implied-in-fact had arisen
from the conduct of the parties; that the terms of this contract were
'Martin v. Camnpanaro et al, In re Suburban Bus Co., Inc., (C.C.A. 2, 1946),
156 F. (2d) 127.
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the same as those of the former contract, and that consequently the
claimants had no right to any additional compensation. The present
appeal was then brought, and the ruling of the court below was
affirmed so far as the effect of the National War Labor Board's
order was concerned. However, the court was of the opinion that,
although the contract was implied in fact and had arisen from the
conduct of the parties in the last year of the company's existence,
it was a contract to pay the reasonable value of the services rendered,
and therefore ordered a new hearing to determine the value of
those services.
Contracts, as ordinarily classified, consist of express agreements,
those implied-in-fact, and those implied-in-law, also known as quasicontracts or constructive contracts. 2 An express contract is one the
terms of which are fixed by the written or spoken words of the parties,
which terms, when considered in conjunction with the law governing such agreements, define both the rights and obligations of the respective patties. An implied-in-fact contract, too, is determined by
the parties' agreement, but such agreement must be shown by their
actions, since the phrase assumes no formal express contract made
by them.' If an express contract exists, an implied contract can not
be set up to take its place.4 However, there may be an express contract which contains one or more implied-in-fact terms. 5 Such an
implication arises from the facts and the conduct of the parties, and
fills in the gap left in the original agreement. The implied term is
not necessarily what the parties actually intended to agree to, but
is the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from their overt conduct
and the circumstances of the case. As in the case of express contracts,
the test of the contract is an objective rather than a subjective one. 6
2

Wickham v. Weil, 43 N.Y. 155, 17 N.Y. S. 518 (1892).
v. Vara, 136 Misc. 500, 241 N.Y.S. 202 at 206 (1930): "An implied contract is an actual contract, circumstantially proved-a true contract resting
upon an implied promise, for which the assent of both parties is necessary; and
unless they have so conducted themselves that their assent may be fairly inferred, they have not contracted."
4 See 13 C.J. 243, and cases cited in footnote 54.
3 Smith

example of this situation is found in Austin v. Wohler, 5 Il. App. 300
(1879), where a contract in writing was entered into, but nothing was said with
regard to the time in which the labor and materials contracted for were to be
furnished. This was held to be a contract "partly express and partly implied,"
the implied stipulation as to time being that time which it is supposed the parties
intended or would have written into the contract if they had thought about it.
6The problem of the subjective and the objective tests of contract is discussed by
Williston in an article, "Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts," in 14
Ill. L. R. 525 (May, 1919). He points out that, although we repeat over and
over that mutual assent is necessary to the formation of the contract, yet the
true meaning of the statement is often misconstrued. Until nearly the end of
the Eighteenth Century assent was determined by almost purely external
means. Thereafter for almost a hundred years, external actions became merely
necessary evidence with which to prove the actual mutual assent, which actual
assent was felt necessary to the existence of a true contract. However, on the
basis of necessity, the courts of both England and America, and particularly
5 An
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Quasi-contracts, those implied-in-law, are sometimes said not to

be true contracts at all. There the obligation rises, not from the intention or consent of the parties, but from a duty imposed by the
law itself. The contractural remedy of general assumpsit is available to the party injured in order that he may have the relief to
which he is in justice entitled, despite the fact that no actual contract
has been entered into? In the case of Hertzog v. Hertzog, in
which the types of contracts are carefully distinguished, the court
remarks:
"But it appears in another place, 3 Comm. 159-166, that
Blackstone introduces this thought about reason and justice
dictating contracts, in order to embrace, under his definition of
an implied contract, another large class of relations, which involve no intention to contract at all, though they may be treated
as if they did. Thus, whenever, not our variant notions of
reason and justice, but the common sense and common justice
of the country, and therefore the common law or statute law,
impose on any one a duty, irrespective of contract, and allow
it to be enforced by a contract remedy, he calls this a case
of implied contract. Thus out of torts grows the duty of compensation, and in many cases the tort may be waived, and the
action brought in assumpsit.
"It is quite apparent, therefore, that radically different relations are classified under the same term, and this must
often give rise to indistinctness of thought And this was not
all necessary; for we have another well-authorized technical
term exactly adapted to the office of making a true distinction. The latter class are merely constructive contracts, while
the former are truly implied ones. In the one case the contract is a mere fiction, a form imposed in order to adapt the
case to a given remedy; in the other it is a fact legitimately
inferred. In one, the intention is disregarded; in the other,
it is ascertained and enforced. In one, the duty defines the
contract; in the other, the contract defines the duty."
Let us presume a case in which a contractor and a lot owner
are involved. If the parties, either by written or by oral stipulations,
reach an agreement, they are bound by an express contract. If they
the latter, finally veered away from this theory and back to the former one.
They now hold that the words and actions of the parties, objectively judged,
form the standard of rights and liabilities. "The expression of mutual assent,
and not the assent itself is the external element of contractual liabbility." Thus
it can be seen that many cases can arise where the spoken or written word will
not actually express the intent of the parties, but will, none-the-less, 'bind
them. Similarly with an implied contract, the implication rests on the inferences
which can reasonably be drawn from the conduct shown, and here again the
parties may find themselves bound to a contract which they did not actually
intend to make. Actions, as well as words, may have a significance of which the
parties were not conscious at the time.
7 Situations of this type are discussed by George P. Costigan, Jr., in his article,
"Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Mutual Assent," in 33 Harvard L.R. 376
8 (January, 1920).
Herzog v. Herzog, 29 Pa. 465 at 467 (1857).
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agree on all particulars, except that no time is set in which the
work is to be done, they may be said to have an express agreement
containing an implied-in-fact term that the work should be finished
in a reasonable time or at a specific time indicated by their actions
and what a reasonable man would deduce from them. If the lot
owner were by his actions to encourage the contractor to build the
house, no expressed agreement having been reached, there could be
an implied contract drawn from the actions of the parties. If there
had been an express contract, but the contractor did not complete
the work, he could not recover on the actual contract which he had
breached. In such a case, however, the property owner would be
under an obligation to pay for the value of the work done, provided
that the breach was not one made in bad faith. This obligation
would be a quasi-contractual one. It would arise, not because he
contracted to have this type of house built for him or the house
in its unfinished state, but because he has received some benefit from
the work of the contractor and should be compelled in justice to
pay for the benefits received.9 This he might reduce by a counterclaim for damages due to the breach of the express agreement.
The measure of quasi-contract recovery is stated to be enrichment or benefit to the defendant. This may differ in amount from
the recovery on an implied contract, where the reasonable value of
the services of the plaintiff would be recovered unless there was
something in the implied agreement to the contrary. However, the
benefit to, or unjust enrichment of, the defendant is oftentimes considered an unfair measure of recovery. Particularly when this benefit is hard to measure, courts are inclined to fall back on the quantum
meruit theory, recovery being measured by resort to any contract
which the parties attempted to make or which one of them repudiated.
This is criticized by Costigan, who asserts that when the court allows
a contract measure of damages it is really enforcing an implied contract, regardless of what it thinks it is doing. In his opinion this
borderline type of contract which contains certain quasi-contractual
characteristics, but requires a contract measure of recovery in order
OSee Pinches v. Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Church, 55 Conn. 183, 10 At
264 (1887). Here the plaintiff contractor sued to recover for work and materials furnished in the erection of a church. Most of the deviations complained
about by the defendant were due to unintentional errors on the part of the
contractor, which did not, however, render the building unusable. In rendering
its decision for the plaintiff, the court remarked, "... the weight of authority
is now clearly in favor of allowing compensation for services rendered and
materials furnished under a special contract, but not in entire conformity with
it, provided that the deviation from the contract was not wilful, and the other
party has availed himself of, and been benefited by, such labor and materials;
and as a general rule the amount of such compensation is to depend upon the
extent of the benefit conferred, having reference to the contract price for the
entire work.."
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to give justice to the injured party, is what he terms a no-meetingof-the-minds, implied-in-fact contract; that is, one in which the intentions of the parties never merged in fact, but where their overt
actions could lead the reasonable person to the conclusions which
the court has incorporated into the contract as its terms. Naturally,
if such is the case, the contract measure of damages, recovery to the
plaintiff on the basis of what his services were worth, becomes the
proper one.10
Even with these matters in mind the problem of classifying the
obligation in the instant case still remains difficult. The court in
rendering its decision spoke of the contract as one implied-in-fact,
but in a footnote appended to the case it showed its doubt by remarking, "In the instant case it makes no difference as to the amount
of recovery whether the claims be granted on a contract impliedin-fact or on a quasi-contract, but we think it was a contract of the
kind described in the text.""1
As pointed out above, if the court had determined that the contract was one implied-in-fact, the reasonable value of the plaintiffs'
services would have been the proper measure of damages; whereas
if it were one implied-in-law, the plaintiffs would be limited to the
amount by which the defendant had been unjustly enriched. The
fact that the only possible measure of the unjust enrichment would
be the reasonable value of the plaintiffs' services means, at least according to Professor Costigan's theory, that this is a no-meeting-ofthe-minds, implied-in-fact contract on which a contract remedy should
be allowed. In his article on implied-in-fact contracts, he discusses
the situation which arises when one member of a household sues
another for the value of services performed, and points out, as did
the court in this case, that if recovery were allowed in such a case,
it would be on the contract theory of the reasonable value of the
plaintiff's services, rather than the quasi-contractual measure of enrichment of the defendant, although in fact there would probably
2
be no difference in amount between the two.'
It seems that the court was correct in its holding that an impliedin-fact contract had arisen from the conduct of the employer bus
company and the employes who continued to work for it after the
expiration of the 1943-44 contract. Therefore, the next question to
be considered is a determination of the exact terms of the contract.
Did the conduct of the parties lead to the conclusion that the new
contract contained the same terms as the old one, or were the bus
drivers working for the reasonable value of their services after May
10 Supra, footnote 7.
"1Campanero, In re Suburban Bus Co., Inc., 156 F (2d) 127 at 131 (1946).
12 Supra, footnote 7.
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24, 1944, when the old contract expired? Here the employer is aided
by a presumption that when an employe continues to work after the
original period of his employment has ended, nothing being said about
changes in working hours, conditions, or wages, a new contract has
been formed, the terms of which are the same as those of the preceding one. This presumption is rebuttable by evidence showing a
different intention.'s
In commenting on the effect of this presumption, the Court stated:
"A contract implied in fact derives from the 'presumed'
intention of the parties as indicated by their conduct. When
an agreement expires by its terms, if, without more, the parties
continue to perform as theretofore, an implication arises that
they have mutually assented to a new contract containing the
same provisions as the old. Ordinarily, the existence of such
a new contract is determined by the 'objective' test, i.e., whether
a reasonable man would think the parties intended to make
such a new binding agreement - whether they acted as if they
so intended.
"Applying that test, as it is now applied by the New York
(as well as most other) courts, no new contract to continue
on the old terms came into being here. In the light of the
notice of unsuccessful negotiations, the activities of the Mediation Board, the hearings before the National War Labor Board,
and the wartime no-strike pledge given by organized labor we think that a 'reasonable man' would not believe that, when
these employees continued to work, while their representative,
Amalgamated, was making efforts to procure revised terms,
they were agreeing to work, in the interval, at old rates."'1
Under the new Federal rules findings of fact may not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous.15 This gives an opportunity to the
appellate court, which it would not have had prior to the adoption of
the Code, to review and reweigh the evidence in a case where a
jury has been waived.
Judge Frank, in this case, exercised his right to review, and
found that the findings were not only clearly erroneous, but that
"a reasonable man would not believe" the conclusions adopted by
the trial court. This is even a stronger statement than is needed in
order to justify the court's reversing the decision on the basis of
the evidence presented.
231 See note in L.R.A. 1918 C, p. 706.
' 4 Martin v. Campanaro, supra, at 129.

15 Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, Rule 52

(a).
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Whether all would agree with the conclusion reached as to the
weight and effect of the evidence is questionable. The laboring man's
point of view seems to have been taken throughout, and the terms
of the contract have been arrived at by a consideration of what he
alone intended, or did not intend, or could be presumed to have
intended. The old concept that it takes two contracting parties to
form an agreement seems to have received little consideration.
FRANCES M. RYAN

